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When workers differ according to the value imputed to leisure, we show that, under some 
conditions, two wages emerge in equilibrium. The commuting cost affects the land market but 
also the labor market through wages. Workers’ productivity also affects housing prices and 
this impact can be positive or negative depending on the location in the city. One important 
aspect of our model is that, even with positive search costs, wage dispersion prevails in 
equilibrium, a feature not possible in the non-spatial model. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is widely documented that unemployment varies between the regions of a country (Isser-
man et al., 1986, Gordon, 1987, Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1994), between cities of diﬀerent
sizes and functions (Marston, 1985), between the inner and outer areas of cities and between
the urban and rural areas. There are also stark spatial diﬀerences in incomes. For exam-
ple, in the United States, the median income of central city residents is 40 percent lower
than that of suburban residents. Despite these features, very few theoretical attempts have
been made to better understand the working of the urban labor market and, in particular,
urban unemployment and spatial wage dispersion. Indeed, labor economists and macro-
economists traditionally do not incorporate space directly into their studies (see e.g. Layard
et al., 1991; Pissarides, 2000; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004), even though there are some
well-known empirical studies of local labor markets (see e.g. Holzer, 1989; Eberts and Stone,
1992). Similarly, in urban economics, despite numerous empirical studies, the theory of ur-
ban labor economics has been relatively neglected. In most advanced urban textbooks (see,
in particular, Fujita, 1989; Fujita et al. 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002) it is mainly assumed
throughout perfect competition in the laborm a r k e ta n dt h ei s s u eo fu r b a nu n e m p l o y m e n t
is not even discussed.
It seems, in particular, quite natural to introduce space in a search-matching model
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000) because distance interacts with the diﬀu-
sion of information. In his seminal contribution to search, Stigler (1961) puts geographical
dispersion as one of the four immediate determinants of price ignorance. In most search
models, say for example Diamond (1982), distance between agents or units implies a ﬁxed
cost of making another draw in the distribution. In other words, a spatial dispersion of
agents creates more search frictions.
There is by now a small literature on urban search models (Zenou, 2008). In all these
models (Simpson, 1992; Coulson et al., 2001; Sato, 2001; 2004; Wasmer and Zenou, 2002;
2006; Smith and Zenou, 2003), the wage is determined by a bilateral bargaining between
the ﬁrm and the worker so that all workers are paid the same wage and no spatial wage
distribution emerges in equilibrium. There is however an important literature in search
(Mortensen, 2003) focussing on wage dispersion where ﬁrms post wages instead of bargaining
them with workers. The starting point is the Diamond paradox (Diamond, 1971), which says
that, when all workers are identical, then, even in the presence of search frictions, the only
2equilibrium is for all ﬁrms to post the reservation wage of workers. In order to obtain a
wage dispersion and to avoid the Diamond paradox, researchers have introduced multiple
job oﬀers (Burdett and Judd, 1983), workers’ heterogeneity (Albrecht and Axell, 1984), and
on-the-job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).
The aim of this paper is to develop an urban-search model in which ﬁrms post wages and
derive the implications in the land and labor markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst paper that does so.
To be more precise, we ﬁrst consider a model where all workers are homogenous and locate
in a monocentric city. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium, which requires solving
simultaneously an urban land use equilibrium and a labor market equilibrium. We show
that the Diamond paradox holds. We also show that higher unemployment rate increases
the employed workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price in the employment
area. We then extend this model by considering two types of workers who diﬀer according
to the value imputed to leisure. We show that, under some conditions, there is a spatial
wage dispersion so that the Diamond paradox does not hold anymore. We show that the
commuting cost aﬀects the land market but also the labor market through wages. We also
ﬁnd that workers’ productivity aﬀects housing prices and that this impact can be positive
or negative depending on the location in the city. One important aspect of our model is
that, even with positive search costs, wage dispersion prevails in equilibrium, a feature not
possible in the non-spatial model.
2 E xa n t ei d e n t i c a lw o r k e r s
There is a continuum of ex ante identical workers whose mass is N and a continuum of
ex ante identical ﬁrms whose mass is 1. Among the N workers, there are L employed
and U unemployed so that N = L + U. The workers are uniformly distributed along a
linear, closed and monocentric city. Their density at each location is taken to be 1. There
is no vacant land in the city and all land is owned by absentee landlords. All ﬁrms are
exogenously located in the Business District (BD hereafter) and consume no space. The BD
is a unique employment center located at one end of the linear city. In a centralized city, it
corresponds to the Central Business District (CBD), whereas, in a completely decentralized
city, it represents the Suburban Business District (SBD). Workers are assumed to be inﬁnitely
3lived, risk neutral and decide their optimal place of residence between the BD and the city
fringe.
There is no on-the-job search and thus only the unemployed workers search for a job and
receive information about job openings. We denote by aU the oﬀer arrival rate faced by an
unemployed worker.1 Workers respond to oﬀers as soon as they arrive. There is no recall.
Jobs are destroyed at exogenous rate δ. It is assumed that there exists a wage cumulative
distribution function F(wL)t h a ti sk n o w nb ye v e r y b o d y ,i . e .w o r k e r sk n o wF(wL)b u td o
not know which ﬁrm oﬀers which wage. The support of F(wL)i s[ 0 ,wL], where wL is very
large.
A steady-state equilibrium requires solving simultaneously an urban land use equilibrium
and a labor market equilibrium. It is convenient to present ﬁrst the former and then the
latter.
2.1 Urban land-use equilibrium
Each individual is identiﬁed with one unit of labor. Each employed worker goes to the BD
to work and incurs a ﬁxed monetary commuting cost τ per unit of distance. When living
at a distance x from the BD, he/she also pays a land rent R(x), consumes hL =1u n i t yo f
land and earns a wage wL (that will be determined at the labor market equilibrium). The
instantaneous (indirect) utility of an employed worker located at a distance x from the BD
is equal to:
WL(x)=wL − τx− R(x)( 1 )
and the bid rent is:2
ΨL(x,WL)=wL − τx− WL (2)
where WL is the common utility level obtained by all employed workers in the city. Con-
cerning the unemployed, they commute less often to the BD since they mainly go there to
search for jobs. So, we assume that they incur a commuting cost sτ p e ru n i to fd i s t a n c e ,
1The subscripts U and L stand for “unemployed” and “employed” respectively.
2The bid rent is a standard concept in urban economics. It indicates the maximum land rent that a
worker located at a distance x from the BD is ready to pay in order to achieve a utility level (Fujita, 1989).
4where 0 <s≤ 1 is a measure of search intensity or search eﬃciency; s is assumed to be
exogenous. For example s = 1 would mean that the unemployed workers go everyday to the
BD (as often as the employed workers) to search for jobs. Thus, here, the cost of searching is
captured through the increase in commuting costs since higher s implies higher commuting
costs sτx. This is mainly because it is assumed that information about jobs is only gathered
in the employment center (BD).3 Unemployed workers consume hU = 1 unity of land and
thus their instantaneous (indirect) utility when residing at a distance x from the BD is given
by:
WU(x)=wU − sτx− R(x)( 3 )
where wU indicates the unemployment insurance payment. The bid rent is thus given by:
ΨU(x,WU)=wU − sτ x − WU (4)
where WU is the common utility level obtained by all unemployed workers in the city. Because
the bid rent of the employed workers is steeper than that of the unemployed workers, the
former live close to jobs while the latter reside farther away. This pattern can capture both
the European and American situations. Indeed, if the BD is interpreted as the Central
Business District, then we have the European structure where the rich/employed workers
live in the city-center and the poor/unemployed at the outskirts of the city. If the BD is
the Suburban Business District, then the rich/employed workers live at the periphery while
the poor reside in the city-center. What is important here is that in both situations the rich
live close to jobs, which is the case in Paris and London and in New York or Los Angeles
(Brueckner et al., 1999; Glaeser et al., 2008).
Deﬁnition 1 An urban-land use equilibrium with ex ante identical workers is a 3-tuple
(W∗
L,W∗
U,R ∗(x)) such that:
ΨU(N,W
∗











L),0} at each x ∈ (0,N]( 7 )
3We could also have introduced other search costs that are not-distance related. This would have com-
plicated the model without altering any of our results.
5Equations (5), (6) and (7) reﬂect the equilibrium conditions in the land market. Equation
(5) says that, at the city fringe N, the bid rent of the unemployed workers must be equal to
the agricultural land rent RA, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. Equation
(6) states that, at L, the border between the employed and unemployed workers, the bid
rent oﬀered by the employed is equal to the bid rent oﬀered by the unemployed workers.
These two equations guarantee that the equilibrium land rent is everywhere continuous in
the city. Finally, equation (7) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent as the upper envelope of the
equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers and the agricultural rent line. Observe that since
all N workers consume 1 unit of housing each, and since there will be no vacant land inside
the city, the distance from the BD to the urban fringe must be given by N and the border
by L. As a result, the employed reside between 0 and L whereas the unemployed reside
between L and N. Solving these equations leads to:
W
∗
U = wU − sτ N (8)
W
∗
L = wL − (1 − s)τL− sτ N






τ (sN − x)+( 1− s)τN(1 − u)f o r0 ≤ x ≤ L
sτ (N − x)f o r L<x≤ N
0f o r x>N
(10)
O b s e r v et h a tt h el a b o rm a r k e ta ﬀects the land market through both the unemployment rate
and the wage. In particular, higher wages increases workers’ utility while higher unemploy-
ment rate increases the employed workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price
in the employment area. Indeed, when u increases, L =( 1− u)N, which is both the size
of the employment area and the employment level, decreases. As a result, on average, the
employed workers are closer to jobs and thus spend less in commuting costs, which increases
their utility. This, in turn, decreases their bid rent (see (2)) and thus the housing price
within the employment area also decreases at each x.
2.2 Labor-market equilibrium
We can now solve the labor-market equilibrium. We follow here the wage posting literature
(Mortensen, 2000, 2003) where the total mass of ﬁrms is ﬁx e dt o1 ,s ot h a tt h e r ei sn oaf r e e -
6entry condition and thus no endogenous job creation. Also, the contact rates for both ﬁrms
and workers are exogenous and not determined using a matching function (as in Pissarides,
2000). Of course, as shown by Mortensen (2000) and Gaumont et al. (2006), including these
two aspects in a wage posting model is straightforward and does not generally change the
results.
Employed workers The Bellman equation for the employed workers is given by:
rIL(wL)=wL − (1 − s)τN(1 − u) − sτ N − δ[IL(wL) − IU]( 1 1 )
where r is the discount factor. Indeed, employed workers obtain today W∗
L = wL−(1 − s)τN(1 − u)−
sτ N, but can lose their job at rate δ, and then obtain a negative surplus of −[IL(wL) − IU].
Equation (11) implies that:
IL(wL) − IU =
wL − (1 − s)τN(1 − u) − sτ N − rIU
r + δ
(12)
T h e r ei st h u sar e s e r v a t i o nw a g ewr
L, i.e. the wage below which unemployed workers refuse
to accept a job oﬀer, which is deﬁned as follows:
IL(w
r
L) − IU =0⇔ w
r
L = rIU +( 1− s)τN(1 − u)+sτ N (13)
Unemployed workers The Bellman equation for the unemployed workers is given by:




[IL(wL) − IU]dF(wL)( 1 4 )
where aU is the exogenous job acquisition rate. Indeed, unemployed workers obtain today
W∗
L = wU −sτ N, but can have a contact with a ﬁrm at rate sa U, and transform this contact
into a match if the oﬀer is greater or equal than the reservation wage wr
L. In that case, they
obtain a positive surplus of IL(wL) − IU. As stated above, there is a cost of searching s,
which is captured by the total commuting costs sτ N, and a reward since higher job search









7which, using (12), is equivalent to:
w
r






[wL − (1 − s)τN(1 − u) − sτ N − rIU]dF(wL)
Using (13), we ﬁnally obtain:
w
r








L)dF(wL)( 1 5 )
Unemployment rate The dynamics of the unemployment level is equal to:
d[u(t)N]
dt
= δ[1 − u(t)]N − sa U u(t)[1− F(w
r
L)] N
where u(t) is the unemployment rate at time t. Indeed, at each time t,[ 1 − u(t)]N em-
ployed workers lose their jobs at rate δ while u(t)N unemployed workers ﬁnd a job at rate
sa U u(t)[1− F(wr
L)], which is the product of the contact rate sa U u(t) and the acceptation








δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
L)]
(16)
Employment size in a ﬁrm Denote by l(wL) the employment level of a ﬁrm that
oﬀers a wage wL to its employees. Denote also by G(wL) the proportion of employed workers
in the economy receiving a wage no greater than wL. The dynamics of G(wL)i sg i v e nb y
d[G(wL,t)(1 − u(t))N]
dt
= sa U [F(wL) − F(w
r
L)]u(t)N − δG(wL,t)[1− u(t)]N
where d[G(wL,t)(1 − u(t))N]/dt is the variation of employed workers receiving a wage no
greater than wL, sa U [F(wL) − F(wr
L)]u(t)N is the ﬂow at time t of unemployed workers
into ﬁrms oﬀering a wage no greater than wL, δG(wL,t)[1− u(t)]N is the ﬂow at time
t of employed workers out of ﬁrms oﬀering a wage no greater than wL. In steady-state,








8We can now determine the employment size in a ﬁrm. The employment size l(wL) (the
measure of workers) per ﬁrm earning a wage wL can be expressed as
l(wL)=l i m
ε→0
G(wL) − G(wL − ε)
F(wL) − F(wL − ε)
(1 − u)N (18)
where [G(wL) − G(wL − ε)](1 − u)N represents the steady-state number of workers earning
a wage in the interval [wL − ε,wL]a n dF(wL) − F(wL − ε)i st h em e a s u r eo fﬁrms oﬀering
a wage in the interval [wL − ε,wL].
Lemma 1 Equation (18) is equivalent to
l(wL)=
sa U N
δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
L)]
(19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (19) speciﬁes the steady-state number of workers available to a ﬁrm oﬀering
any particular wage, conditional on the wages oﬀered by other ﬁrms, represented by the
distribution F(.), and the workers’ reservation wage wr








L)] iﬀ wL ≥ wr
L
0i ﬀ wL <w r
L
(20)
Wage posting Firms post wages. As in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), ﬁrms are
interested in maximizing steady-state proﬁt, and will hire as many workers as are willing to
accept. The proﬁto faﬁrm that sets a wage wL is given by:
Π =m a x
wL
(y − wL)l(wL)











iﬀ wL ≥ wr
L
0i ﬀ wL <w r
L
(21)







and thus F(wL) is degenerated to one point w∗
L = wr
L.
9Proof. See the Appendix.
This means that w∗
L = wr
L is a mass point and the wage distribution is degenerated to
one point w∗
L = wr
L. This result is due to the fact that l(wL)i si n d e p e n d e n to fwL.T h i si s
the so-called Diamond’s paradox (Diamond, 1971).
2.3 Steady-state equilibrium
In equilibrium, since all ﬁrms set w∗
L = wr












L = wU +( 1− s)τN(1 − u)( 2 2 )









δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
L)]
¶
and since 1 − F(wr





L = wU +( 1− s)τN
µ
sa U
δ + sa U
¶
(23)
This is the equilibrium wage obtained by all workers. The unemployment beneﬁt wU,i st h e
only labor-market part of the wage. It increases with w∗
L because rIU increases and thus
workers are more demanding and increase their reservation wage. This is what is obtained





,i sw h a t
ﬁrms must give to workers to compensate for the spatial cost diﬀerence between employed






i.e. when the land rent of employed and unemployed workers is the same. In particular, if
aU increases or δ decreases, then wages increase because the spatial cost diﬀerence between
employed and unemployed workers increases since employed workers are on average further




R 0 ⇔ s S
1
2
10Indeed, there are two opposite eﬀects of an increase of s on the wage w∗
L.O n t h e o n e
hand, increasing s reduces the spatial compensation since the spatial cost diﬀerence between
employed and unemployed workers is smaller. On the other hand, it increases the chance to
obtain a job and thus the employment rate, which, in turn, increases the distance to jobs for
the employed worker located at x = L. This raises the spatial compensation and thus the
wage.
For the model to make sense, we assume that y>w ∗
L so that ﬁrms do not make negative
proﬁt s .T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o :
y − wU > (1 − s)τN
µ
sa U
δ + sa U
¶
(24)





L,R ∗(x)),w h e r ewr∗
L = w∗
L is deﬁn e db y( 2 3 ) ,F∗(wL) is





δ + sa U
∙
y − wU − (1 − s)τN
µ
sa U
























for 0 ≤ x ≤ L
sτ (N − x) for L<x≤ N
0 for x>N
(28)
Observe that all workers participate to the labor market because all workers search for a





2.4 Interaction between land and labor markets

















11Not surprisingly, when y, the productivity of workers, increases, ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase. The
eﬀects of wU, s, τ and N only go through the wage w∗
L and thus when they increase w∗
L,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are reduced. The ambiguity of s stems from the ambiguity of the eﬀect of s
on w∗
L mentioned above. On the other hand, aU and δ aﬀect both the employment in the
ﬁrm l(wL) and the wage w∗
L.A sar e s u l t ,w h e naU increases or δ decreases, then both the
employment l(wL) and the wage w∗
L increase, and thus the eﬀect on proﬁts is ambiguous.
However, if the productivity y is high enough, then the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second one,
and the net impact is positive.
Second, by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium land rent (28), for the employed workers, i.e.














These results are mainly due to eﬀects on the competition on the land market. Indeed, when
aU increases or δ decreases, then the employment level N(1 − u∗) in the economy increases,
which means that employed workers are on average further away from jobs. The access to
the job center becomes more valuable, which increases the competition in the land market
since employed workers bear higher commuting costs than the unemployed workers. As a
result, housing prices increase everywhere in the city between x =0a n dx = L but not in the
unemployment area, i.e. when x ∈ ]L,N]. Figure 1 illustrates this eﬀect. Before the shock
(i.e. increase in aU or decrease in δ), the land rent is given by the normal line while after,
it is described by the thick line. The equilibrium values with one and two stars correspond
respectively to before and after the shock. Finally, an increase in τ, s or N,i n c r e a s e st h e
competition in the land market because it becomes more costly to travel to the job center
and therefore housing prices increase.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3 Ex ante heterogenous workers
Following Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Gaumont et al. (2006), we now assume that there
are two types of individuals in the economy who diﬀer according to the value imputed to
leisure. This assumption ensures that there can be at most two wages oﬀered in equilibrium.
Individuals are denoted by superscript i =0 ,1. Because the ﬁrst individual is assumed to


















where ui = Ui/N i is the unemployment rate of type−i workers.
3.1 Urban land-use equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will be four types of workers: the unemployed workers of types 0 and





L (this will be shown below). As we will also see below, in equilibrium, workers
of both types 0 and 1 can earn the high wage w1
L while only workers of types 0 can earn the
low wage w0
L. As the result, for employed workers, types do not always correspond to wages.
We now relax the assumption of housing consumption equal to 1 for all workers and assume





L >h U =1 ( 3 1 )
where hi
L is the housing consumption of an employed worker earning a wage wi
L and hU is
the housing consumption of an unemployed worker. Even though it can be confusing to use
the same notation i for workers’ types and workers’ wages, we keep it to avoid too many
notations. Assumption (31) reﬂects the fact that richer workers consume more land, which is
a well-documented fact (see e.g. Glaeser et al., 2007). Observe that, because the unemployed
h a v et h es a m er e v e n u ewU, then they all consume the same amount of land hU.A sa b o v e ,
we can write the instantaneous (indirect) utility functions of an employed worker earning a
wage wi












Observe that the type i =0 ,1 of a worker plays a role only when they are unemployed since
it determines si.T h et y p ei is however irrelevant when they are employed since what matters
is only the wage. As a result, in Wi
U(x), the superscript i indicates the type of workers while,
in Wi
L(x), it represents the type of wage a worker earns. As we will see below, this will not
be true for the intertemporal utilities since someone employed has to take into account the
fact that he/she may be unemployed in the future and thus his/her type will matter even
when employed. This is why there are four diﬀerent instantaneous utilities but ﬁve diﬀerent
intertemporal utilities. Let us now determine the bid rents of the employed and unemployed















Depending on the assumptions we make, diﬀerent types of urban equilibria can emerge.
Because we want to be consistent with the previous section, we would like to focus on an
equilibrium where the employed workers reside closer to jobs than the unemployed workers.






which guarantees that, starting from the BD, we ﬁrst locate the type−0e m p l o y e d ,t h e nt h e
type−1 employed, then the type−1u n e m p l o y e da n d ,ﬁnally, the type−0 unemployed.4
Deﬁnition 2 Assume (31) and (32). Then, an urban-land use equilibrium with ex ante


























then we would have had an urban conﬁguration where all the unemployed workers reside close to jobs while




































at each x ∈ (0,N]
The interpretation of the equilibrium conditions are similar to the ones given in Deﬁnition
1, the only diﬀerence being that there are now three borders to be considered. Since U0 =
u0N0, L0 =( 1− u0)N0,a n dL = N − u0N0 − u1N1, solving these equations leads to:
W
0∗
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τu 1N1 for L0 <x≤ L
s1τ (N − x) − (s1 − s0)τu 0N0 for L<x≤ N − U0
s0τ (N − x)f o r N − U0 <x≤ N
0f o r x>N
(37)
The eﬀects are here more complicated than for the homogenous case but the intuition remains
the same. Indeed, the interaction between the land and the labor market is done through
the wages w0
L and w1
L and the unemployment rates u0 and u1. Here also, an increase in u0
and/or u1 increase the workers’ utility but decrease the equilibrium land rent.
153.2 Labor-market equilibrium
Firms post wages. Let θ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of ﬁrms posting the high wage w1
L and
thus 1 − θ the fraction posting the low wage w0
L. As in the previous section, given any
distribution of posted wages F(wL), each worker of type i will have a reservation wage wri
L
such that he/she accepts a job if wL ≥ wri
L and rejects it if wL <w ri
L,w i t hwr1
L >w r0
L .I t
should also be clear that, in equilibrium, no ﬁrm will post anything other than the reservation
wage of workers, as a ﬁrm posting wL ∈ (wr0
L ,w r1
L )c o u l dr e d u c ewL down to wr0
L and make
more proﬁt per worker without changing the set of workers who accept. This was the same
argument made in the proof of Proposition 1.
Unemployed workers S i n c ew ea l r e a d yk n o wt h a tt h eo n l yt w op o s t e dw a g e sa r ewr1
L
and wr0






































U is the value function of an unemployed worker of type i =0 ,1w h i l eI
i,j
L is the
value function of an employed worker of type i =0 ,1a n de a r n i n gaw a g ej =0 ,1, where the
superscript j corresponds to a wage w
rj
L . In this formulation, a value function I
1,0
L cannot
exist since a type−1w o r k e rw i l la l w a y sr e f u s eaj o bo ﬀer with a wage wr0
L . Indeed, type−1
workers accept the high wage wr1
L but not the low wage wr0
L while type−0 workers accept
































16Employed workers Similarly, the relevant steady-state Bellman equations for the em-







































































δ + s1 aU θ
(46)
Indeed, workers of type 0 accept any job oﬀer (wr0∗
L or wr1∗
L ) while workers of type 1 only
accept high-wage jobs, which arrive at rate s1 aU θ. As a result, the higher the fraction of
ﬁrms posting the high wage, the lower the unemployment rate for type−1w o r k e r s .
Wages We have the following result:
Proposition 3 The ﬁrms post the following wages:
w
r1∗









































r + δ + s1aU θ

















s0aU θ(s1 − s0 − (1 − s0h0
L)) − (1 − s0h0
L)(r + δ)




















Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition conﬁrms that wr1∗
L >w r0∗
L , which is not always true since there is a short-
run cost (higher commuting costs) and a long-run gain (higher contact rate with ﬁrms) of
providing search eﬀort. Inequality (49) is a suﬃcient condition that involves only parameters
and guarantees that wr1∗
L >w r0∗
L . As can be seen in the Appendix, the high wage wr1∗
L is
determined by (55), i.e. W1∗
L = W1∗
U while the low wage wr0∗





U + s0aU θW1∗
L
r + δ + s0aU θ
These two conditions are roughly equivalent to the ones obtained in the non-spatial case
where wages and unemployment beneﬁts are involved instead of utilities (see Gaumont et
al., 2006, page 834). What is crucial here is the fact that the competition in the land market














Contrary to the non-spatial model, the high wage wr1∗
L depends on θ b e c a u s ea ni n c r e a s ei n
θ aﬀects negatively u1,w h i c ha ﬀects the location of workers in city (the employed are closer






(r + δ)(s1 − s0)s0aUτ





















∂θ < 0. A similar eﬀect was present in the non-spatial model, but it was always
positive. Here the mechanism is quite diﬀerent since it goes through u1 and thus the com-
petition in the land market while, in the non-spatial model, it was through the job contact
rate s0aU θ.
18Firms Instead of following the approach of Albrecht and Axell (1984) as we did in
the previous section, we now follow that of Gaumont et al. (2006) because it is simpler.
Of course the two approaches are equivalent. Firms maximize steady-state proﬁts. There
are two types of ﬁrms i =0 ,1; those oﬀering the high wage wr1∗
L (type−1 ﬁrms) and those
oﬀering the low wage wr0∗











where ρi is the probability a random unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage wri∗
L
and aF is the exogenous rate at which a ﬁrm meets a worker. A job-match is when these
two events are realized, which occurs at rate aFρi.
For a type−1 ﬁrm posting the high wage wr1∗
L , ρ1 =1s i n c eaj o bo ﬀer is never turned






since a job oﬀer is only accepted by unemployed workers of type 0. Using (45) and (46), this
can be written as:
ρ
0 =
(δ + s1 aU θ)N0
(δ + s1 aU θ)N0 +( δ + s0 aU)N1 (51)
In order to avoid the Diamond’s paradox (Proposition 1), i.e. only the lowest wage
is posted in equilibrium, one needs to write a condition that guarantees that both wages
wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L coexist in equilibrium. For that, it has to be that, in equilibrium, ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between posting wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L , otherwise the two wages cannot coexist together.
This is an iso-proﬁt condition. Let us thus calculate the proﬁts Π0 and Π1.





(δ + s1 aU θ)N0

















where the wages wr1∗
L and wr0∗
L are given by (47) and (48), respectively. The iso-proﬁt




















Observe that θ enters in wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L through u1. We have the following result:
Proposition 4 The suﬃcient conditions for a non degenerated labor-market equilibrium
(i.e. 0 <θ ∗ < 1)t oe x i s ta n dt ob eu n i q u ea r ey <y<y,w h e r ey and y are respectively
deﬁned by (60) and (61) in the Appendix.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Even if the conditions are much more complicated than for the non-spatial model, the
intuition remains the same. The productivity y has to be large enough to prevent that all
ﬁrms pay the lowest wage wr0∗
L and low enough to prevent that all ﬁrms pay the highest wage
wr1∗
L . In other words, to obtain wage dispersion, the productivity y has to have intermediate





The steady-state general equilibrium is then easy to calculate. We assume (31), (32),
(49), and y <y<y.T h e v a l u e o f θ∗ is given by (58) in the Appendix. Then, plugging
this value in (51) and (46), we obtain respectively ρ0∗, the equilibrium probability a random
unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage wr0∗
L and the equilibrium unemployment rate
u1∗ (the other unemployment rate u0∗ is only function of parameters and determined by
(45)). By plugging these values of unemployment rates u0∗ and u1∗ and the value of θ∗ in
(48) and (47), we obtain the wages wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L . Furthermore, by plugging these values of
the wages wr0∗
L and wr1∗
L and the value of θ∗ in (52) and (53), we obtain ﬁrms’ equilibrium
proﬁts Π0∗ and Π1∗. Finally, using the values of the wages and the unemployment rates in




L , and the equilibrium
land rent R∗(x).
3.3 Numerical simulations
We run some numerical simulations in order to obtain reasonable values of unemployment
rates. The values of the parameters (in monthly terms) are the following: There is 70
percent of workers with high value of leisure. The output y is normalized to 1.15 while the
unemployment beneﬁt has a value of 0.32. Pecuniary commuting costs τ are equal to 0.1.
T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sr =0 .01, whereas the job destruction rate is δ =0 .01, which means
20that, on average, workers lose their job every eight years and four months. The contact rate
of ﬁrms aF is 1.5 while for workers it is aU =1 .3s ot h a tt h e yh a v eo na v e r a g er o u g h l ya
contact every 20 days. Table 1 summarizes these diﬀerent values and the ones for search
eﬀorts and housing consumptions.
Table 1. Parameter values
y =1.15 Productivity r =0.01 Pure discount rate
wU =0.32 Unemployment beneﬁt δ =0.01 Job-destruction rate
aF =1.5 Firms’ job contact rate aU =1.3 Workers’ job contact rate
N =10 Total population N0/N =70% Percentage of type−0 workers
τ =0.1 Pecuniary commuting cost N1/N =30% Percentage of type−1 workers
s0=0.08 Search eﬀort of type−0 workers s1=0.1 Search eﬀort of type−1 workers
h0
L=1.1 Housing consumption of type−0 workers h1
L=1.2 Housing consumption of type−1 workers
3.3.1 Steady-state equilibrium
Let us calculate the steady-state equilibrium for these parameters values. The numerical
results of the equilibrium are displayed in Table 2.











U ) 0.24 (22.69)
W1∗
U (I1∗










L ) 0.2212 (22.12)
Π∗ = Π0 = Π1 1.73291
In equilibrium, 44.61 percent of ﬁrms post the high wage w1r∗
L , which is slightly higher
than w0r∗
L .S i n c et h ed i ﬀerence in search intensity between the two types is not very high,
θ∗ =0 .4461 implies that u0∗, the unemployment rate of workers of type 0, is much lower
than u1∗, the unemployment rate of type−1 workers (8.77 versus 14.71%). Indeed, the
arrival rates for type−0a n dt y p e −1 workers are respectively given by s0aU =0 .104 and
s1aU θ =0 .058, which means that their average duration of unemployment is nine and half
months and seventeen months, respectively. Furthermore, ρ0∗, the probability a random
unemployed worker accepts a job oﬀer at wage wr0∗
L ,i se q u a lt o5 8 .19%. This means that
the ﬁrms that post the high wage will transform a contact into a match with probability
1 while this will be true only in 58.19 percent of the time for ﬁrms posting the low wage
since type−1 workers will always refuse such an oﬀer. Since each ﬁrm has a contact with
a worker every 20 days (i.e. aF =1 .5 ) ,t h i sa l s om e a n st h a t ,o na v e r a g e ,am a t c ho c c u r s
every month for ﬁrms posting the low-wage. Table 2 also gives the diﬀerent utilities (both
instantaneous and intertemporal) and one can see that, because of a ﬁercer competition in
the land market for employed workers, their utilities are not always higher than that of the
unemployed workers. Finally, Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 4 by showing that, for low
values of the productivity y (i.e. y ' 0.9), θ∗ ≤ 0 while for high values of y (i.e. y ' 1.2),
θ∗ ≥ 1.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
223.3.2 Interaction between land and labor markets
We would like to pursue our analysis by investigating the interaction between land and labor
markets. For that, we ﬁrst examine the impact of a key spatial variable, the commuting cost
τ, on the equilibrium labor market variables, w0r∗
L , w1r∗
L , θ∗, u1∗,a n dΠ∗.T h e e ﬀects are
complex since τ directly aﬀects the land market through the land rent and the instantaneous
utilities but also indirectly aﬀects the labor market through the wages. Let us better under-
stand these eﬀects. By diﬀerentiating equations (33) to (36), one can see that an increase
in τ, decreases the utilities of the unemployed workers of both types (i.e. W0
U and W1
U)b u t
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the utilities of the employed workers. Indeed, when τ increases,
the competition in the land market increases, so all workers pay higher housing prices and
thus their utilities decrease. This is the direct eﬀect. There is, however, an indirect eﬀect
that goes through u1, since the latter is negatively aﬀected by θ, which itself is aﬀected by
τ.S ow h e nτ increases, u1 changes, which aﬀects the location workers in the city, which, in
turn, aﬀects the competition in the land market and thus the utilities. The latter indirect
eﬀect is only true for the employed workers as can be seen in equations (35) and (36).
Figure 3a displays the negative impact of an increase in τ on wages. Take for example
w1
L = w1r∗
L .B yd i ﬀerentiating (47) with respect to τ, one can see that, holding u1,c o n s t a n t ,
the relationship is positive. Indeed, as stated above, when τ increases, at a given u1,t h e
competition in the land market becomes ﬁercer so that bid rents increase and thus all utilities
decrease. Since w1r∗
L is determined by W1∗
L = W1∗
U , then because these two utilities decrease
and only the ﬁrst one is a function of w1r∗
L , then, following a raise in τ, this wage has to
increase for this equality to be true. Now, when we also take into account the fact that
u1 is a positive function of τ (this eﬀect is indirect and goes through θ), the net eﬀect is
ambiguous. In the numerical example, the indirect negative eﬀect is greater that the positive
direct eﬀect and thus the net eﬀect is negative. The same intuition runs for the low-wage
w0
L = w0r∗.
[Insert Figure 3ah e r e ]
Figures 3b, 3c, and 3d display the other comparative statics results. Not surprisingly, an
increasing in the commuting cost τ decreases θ∗, the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering a high wage,
but increases u1∗, the unemployment rate of type−1w o r k e r s ,a n dΠ∗, ﬁrms’ proﬁt. The
intuition of these results is similar to that of the wages since the eﬀect goes through the land
market. The crucial aspect here is the fact that the land market ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the
23labor market.
[Insert Figures 3b,3c,3dh e r e ]
In order to further analyze the interaction between the two markets, let us now study
the impact of a key labor-market variable, y, on the equilibrium land price R∗(x). Figure
4 displays the result (the variables with one and two stars are respectively the equilibrium
values before and after a change in y; the normal and thick lines correspond respectively
to before and after the increase of y). Remember that Li is the area in the city where
the employed workers earning wir∗
L reside while Ui is the area in the city where type−i
unemployed workers live. Looking at (37), an increase in y aﬀects the bid rents and thus
the competition in the land market only through u1. In particular, y aﬀects negatively u1
since the latter is a negative function of θ, which is itself a positive function of y.S ow h e ny
increases, the areas L0 =( 1− u0)N0 and U0 = u0N0 are not aﬀected while L1 =( 1− u1)N1
expands and U1 = u1N1 shrinks (Figure 4). This is due to the fact that only the bid rents
of the employed workers are aﬀected by a change in y,a n dt h i se ﬀect is positive. Indeed, by

































Ui(x) are the equilibrium land rents at a distance x for the employed
workers earning wir∗
L and type−i unemployed workers, respectively.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
To better understand this result, Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c display the impact of y on the
land rent at x =0 ,x = L0,a n dx = L, respectively. In these ﬁgures, one can see that
the relationship is positive for R∗(0) and R∗(L0) but negative for R∗(L). Indeed, as stated
above, when y increases, the employed’s bid rents increase because the competition in the
land market is ﬁercer due to the fact the unemployment rate u1 decreases. So at x =0a n d
at x = L0 land rents increase because the bid rents of workers earning both w0r∗
L and w1r∗
L
increase and these locations are not aﬀected by a change in y (see Figure 4). Now, when y
24increases, Ψ1
L(x,WL), the bid rent of workers with high wages, increases while Ψ0
L(x,WL),
the bid rent of type−0 unemployed workers, is not aﬀected. As a result, the location x = L
shifts rightward (from L∗ to L∗∗), which makes the competition in the land market less ﬁerce
and thus the land price decreases. This is an interesting eﬀect of workers’ productivity on
housing prices. Similar results can be obtained with other labor-market variables such as, for
example, the job-destruction rate δ,w h i c ha ﬀects the equilibrium land rent only indirectly
through u1.
[Insert Figures 5a,5b,5ch e r e ]
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we propose a search-urban model where ﬁrms post wages. We ﬁrst develop a
model where all workers are identical and show that the Diamond paradox holds, i.e. there is
a unique equilibrium wage even in the presence of search frictions. We investigate the inter-
action between land and labor markets and show, in particular, that higher unemployment
rate increases the employed workers’ utility but decreases the equilibrium housing price in
the employment area. We then develop a model where there are two types of workers who
diﬀer according to the value imputed to leisure. We show that, under some conditions, two
wages will emerge in equilibrium so that the Diamond paradox does not hold anymore. One
interesting aspect of the results is to analyze how the two markets (land and labor) inter-
act with each other. We show that the commuting cost τ directly aﬀects the land market
through the land rent and the instantaneous utilities but also indirectly aﬀects the labor
market through the wages. Another interesting and testable result is the impact of workers’
productivity on housing prices. The impact can be positive or negative depending on the
location in the city.
This model can easily be generalized to K>2 types of workers where there will be
K reservation wages w1∗
L ,...,w K∗




θi = 1 (see Gaumont et al., 2006). In our spatial model, this model will
be very cumbersome to analyze since we will have to locate K types of workers in the city
but it is clearly possible. However, this will not add very much in terms of intuition of the
results than in the case of K =2 .
25One the main critics made in the non-spatial l i t e r a t u r ei st h a tt h e s et y p e so fm o d e l sa r e
not robust to the introduction of any positive search cost. In that case, one typically ends
up with the Diamond paradox and thus with the law of one wage, i.e. no wage dispersion
in equilibrium. The interesting aspect of our spatial model is that this critic does not
hold anymore. Indeed, in our model, there were positive search costs (introduced in the
commuting costs) and we showed that the law of two wages still hold in equilibrium. This is
becauseﬁrms have to compensate workers for the search cost diﬀerence between the employed
and unemployed workers due to the competition in the land market.
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F(wL) − F(wL − ε)
sa U [1 − F(wr
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δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
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Denote limε→0 F(wL − ε)=F(w
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δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
L)]
which is (19).





δ + sa U [1 − F(wr
L)]
< 0
Thus, since the proﬁt is decreasing in wages when wL ≥ wr
L, ﬁrms will set the lowest
possible wage, which is w∗
L = wr
L. No deviation is proﬁtable since a lower wage than wr
L
leads to a zero proﬁt and a higher wage does not increase neither productivity nor l(wL)b u t
increase the cost of labor and thus leads to a lower proﬁt.






which using (34) and (35) leads to (47).






































U + s0aU θW1∗
L
r + δ + s0aU θ





U + s0aU θW1∗
L
r + δ + s0aU θ
(56)
By solving (56) using (33), (35), (36) and (47), we obtain (48).
Let us now show that wr1∗
L >w r0∗
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[1 − (1 − h1
Ls1)u1](r + δ + s0aU θ)














Because 1 − (1 − h1
Ls1)u1 > 0 (since the unemployment rate u1 < 1), a suﬃcient condition


























30which is equivalent to (49).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Using the wages wr1∗
L and wr0∗
L deﬁned by (47) and (48),
































































r + δ + aU s1θ



















































which is equivalent to:
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 +
s1 aUN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 θ
∗ =
(X + y)(δ + s1 aU θ∗)+( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1δ
Zh1




Let us deﬁne the following functions:
f(θ)=
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 +
s1 aUN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 θ
g(θ)=
(X + y)(δ + s1 aU θ∗)+( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1δ
Zh1




Then θ∗ is deﬁned by f(θ)=g(θ). Observe that
f(0) =
δN0





(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 > 0
31g(0) =
X + y +( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1
Zh1




























1 (X + y)s
1 aU
First, we want that: f(0) <g (0). This is equivalent to:
δN0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 <
X + y +( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1
Zh1
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Z − X (60)
It is easy to verify that y >yso the two conditions y>yand y>yreduces to y>y .
S of a rw eh a v es h o w nt h a tf(0) <g (0), f0(θ) > 0a n dg0(θ) < 0. This guarantees that
there exists a unique and strictly positive θ∗. Let us now show that θ∗ < 1. We have:
f(1) =
δ + s1 aU





X (δ + s1 aU)+( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1δ
Yh 1




So, if when θ∗ =1 ,f(1) >g (1), then we are certain that θ∗ < 1 since the intersection
between f(θ)a n dg(θ) occurs before f(θ) >g (θ). The condition f(1) >g (1) is equivalent
to:
(δ + s1 aU)N0
(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 >
X (δ + s1 aU)+( 1− h1
Ls1)τN 1δ
Yh 1













(δ + s0 aU)h1
LN1 −
δ (1 − h1
Ls1)τN 1
δ + s1 aU
− X
(61)
The results then follow.
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Figure 1. Impact of an increase in      or a decrease in δ
on the equilibrium land rent
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Figure 2. Impact of the productivity y on θ 
 





































Figure 3a. Impact of the commuting cost τ on wages  
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Figure 3b. Impact of the commuting cost τ on θ 
 
 













Figure 3c. Impact of the commuting cost τ on the unemployment rate 
















Figure 3d. Impact of the commuting cost τ on the profit 
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Figure 4: Impact of an increase in the productivity y 
on the equilibrium land rent
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 Figure 5b. Impact of the productivity y on the land rent at x = 
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Figure 5c. Impact of the productivity y on the land rent at x = L 
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